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We construct a new measure to capture corporate political connections, which
is based on the amount a corporation spends on socializing with government
oﬃcials. We examine the validity of this measure using the exogenous turnover
of top local oﬃcials and ﬁnd that ﬁrms increase their political networking
expenditures when top local oﬃcials are replaced. Compared to state-owned
enterprises (SOEs), non-state-owned enterprises (non-SOEs) react more
aggressively to changes in local oﬃcials, which implies that non-SOEs have
stronger incentives to build political connections with oﬃcials through social
intercourse. We also ﬁnd that ﬁrms located in regions with low levels of
marketization react more aggressively to the turnover of local politicians. In
addition, we ﬁnd a positive eﬀect of corporate political socializing expenditures
on corporate performance and valuation, which suggests that political
connections built through social intercourse beneﬁt corporations.
 2014 Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. on behalf of China Journal of
Accounting Research. Founded by Sun Yat-sen University and City Univer-
sity of Hong Kong. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).1. Introduction
Due to the lack of comprehensive formal legal and governance mechanisms, remarkably eﬀective alterna-
tive mechanisms have developed in China (Allen et al., 2005). Political connections are one such mechanism
and they play an important role in the Chinese economic regime. Most previous studies of corporate political
connections have used the presence or absence of state ownership or the political background of top executivesYat-sen
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other channels and it is meaningful to identify other important corporate strategies for building political
connections.
Networking with government oﬃcials is a common corporate political strategy in the relationship-based
Chinese regime. Unlike ownership-based or board member political experience-based political connections,
the strategy of socializing with government oﬃcials is implemented through various social activities that
are part of daily business practices and it is thus hard to capture explicitly. Although the political strategy
of social intercourse has been discussed in previous studies, there is little empirical research that systematically
identiﬁes it. One exception is Luo and Ying (2012) who use a particular social activity, company visits of oﬃ-
cials, to identify corporate political connections. In this study, we try to comprehensively capture corporate
political connections built through social intercourse by measuring corporations’ expenditures on political net-
working. We use evidence from a previous survey to construct a variable for measuring corporate expenditures
on networking with government oﬃcials.
Zhang and Zhang (2005) surveyed hundreds of Chinese entrepreneurs and found that ﬁrms socialize with
government oﬃcials in a number of ways including inviting them for a company visit, sponsoring overseas
travel, oﬀering gifts, holding banquets, and so on. Based on their research, we use the accounting items that
are most commonly used to reimburse such expenditures to construct a measure of political networking expen-
ditures. One of the contributions of this study is determining the validity of this measure using the exogenous
turnover of top local oﬃcials. We ﬁnd that ﬁrms increase their expenditures for socializing with government
oﬃcials when local politicians are replaced. This suggests that our measure eﬀectively captures ﬁrms’
expenditures on political social intercourse.
We further ﬁnd that non-SOEs react more aggressively than SOEs when local politicians are replaced and
that ﬁrms located in regions with a low level of marketization react more aggressively to the turnover of top
local oﬃcials. We also use our new measure of political connections to examine the economic consequences of
political networking expenditures. Consistent with previous studies (see among others, Fisman, 2001; Johnson
and Mitton, 2003; Faccio, 2006), we ﬁnd that corporate political socializing expenditures have a positive eﬀect
on corporate performance and valuation, which suggests that the political connections built through social
intercourse beneﬁt corporations.
Our study makes the following contributions to the literature. First, we construct a new measure to capture
corporate political connections, namely political socializing expenditures. Second, socializing with oﬃcials is a
common corporate political strategy that has rarely been mentioned in previous empirical studies, perhaps
because of the diﬃculty in quantifying political socializing. This study quantiﬁes corporate political socializing
by measuring corresponding expenditures and testing the validity of this measure by using the exogenous
turnover of top local oﬃcials. Third, there are few empirical studies of the ﬁrm-level eﬀect of the turnover
of government oﬃcials in China and this study sheds some light on this research area.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the related literature and hypotheses.
Section 3 describes the sample selection and data. Section 4 provides the research design and empirical results.
In Section 5 we present our conclusions.
2. Literature review and hypotheses
Corporate political connections play an important role around the world (see among others, Fisman, 2001;
Faccio, 2006; Faccio et al., 2006; Adhikari et al., 2006; Niessen and Ruenzi, 2010; Chen et al., 2010). In
Chinese studies, corporate political connections are generally correlated with the type of ownership (SOE
vs. non-SOE) or the political experience of top executives (e.g. Hu, 2006; Yu and Pan, 2008). US studies have
documented a variety of strategies used by ﬁrms to make political connections, such as adding politicians to
the board of directors (e.g. Goldman et al., 2008, 2009), making signiﬁcant political campaign contributions
(e.g., Cooper et al., 2010; Claessens et al., 2008), or incurring signiﬁcant lobbying expenditures (e.g., Hill et al.,
2009; Chen et al., 2009).
Unlike the US, lobbying does not publicly exist in China. However, Chinese ﬁrms can seek preferential
treatment through their private networking channels. Zhang and Zhang (2005) surveyed hundreds of entrepre-
neurs in Wenzhou City and Suzhou Province and found that ﬁrms build political networks by socializing with
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holding a banquet, sponsoring the oﬃcials’ travel abroad, oﬀering gifts, and so on.
Following Cai et al. (2011) and Zhang and Zhang (2005), we select the following accounting items as the
most commonly used to reimburse the expenses related to the above-mentioned activities, i.e. travel expenses,
entertainment expenses, overseas training expenses, conference expenses, social expenses and clerical expenses.
Although not all of these expenses will be directly related to political socializing, Cai et al. (2011) show that
entertainment and travel expenses increase ﬁrm value, which suggests that this kind of expenditure is related to
political connections. In this study, we try to capture socializing-based political connections by measuring
political networking expenditures.
Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee (2006) ﬁnd that when the political regime changed in Indonesia (i.e., after Suhar-
to’s resignation), the ﬁrms once closely connected to Suharto systematically changed their ﬁnancing strategy
from domestic ﬁnancing to global ﬁnancing. This result illustrates that the loss of political ties due to the turn-
over of politicians can change corporate ﬁnancing strategies. However, few studies have investigated the eﬀect
of the turnover of politicians on corporate behavior in China, where corporate behavior is seen as government
dominated. As an anecdotal case, Feng Lun, the Chairman of Vantone Holdings, said that “On average, I ﬂy
long-haul 180 times a year; two-thirds of these trips are related to the turnover of government oﬃcials, because
the successors may renege on previous promises or agreements. . .”1 This implies that the turnover of govern-
ment oﬃcials breaks existing corporate-government connections.
In this study, we test the eﬀect of top local government oﬃcial turnover on corporate political socializing
strategies and predict that corporate expenditures on socializing with oﬃcials increase when top local oﬃcials
are replaced. The following policy risk argument and political connection theory support our view.2
The replacement of top local oﬃcials may create policy uncertainty (Julio and Yook, 2012). A corporate
proposal might be adopted more easily by a policy maker who is part of a well-built network; thus networking
reduces policy risk. Local government, as the top administration agency in a municipal region, has the power
to allocate resources; thus, ﬁrms have incentives to build political connections with local government to get
access to valuable resources. An incumbent political tie will be broken when a top local oﬃcial is replaced;
therefore, ﬁrms have incentives to socialize with successors to re-build the political tie. Based on this analysis,
we predict that expenditures on political socializing will increase when a top local oﬃcial is replaced. Our ﬁrst
hypothesis is as follows.
H1. When turnover of top local oﬃcials occurs, corporate expenditures on political networking increase.
Firms with few natural political connections have more incentive to network with government oﬃcials.
Compared to SOEs, non-SOEs have more incentive to establish political connections. Currently, the property
protection regime is relatively weak in China. Non-SOEs that pay more attention to property protection pur-
sue political connections as an alternative protection mechanism (e.g. Bai et al., 2006). In addition, China is a
centrally planned system undergoing a slow and uneven transition to a market economy. The government has
the power to allocate resources, such as bank loans (see among others, Hu, 2006; Yu and Pan, 2008; Zhang
et al., 2010; Lian et al., 2011), access to regulated industries (Luo and Liu, 2009), government subsidies (Chen,
2003; Pan et al., 2009; Yu et al., 2010) and so on. To obtain their preferred resource allocations, non-SOEs
have more incentive to establish and maintain political connections. Based on this analysis, we predict that
non-SOEs will socialize more aggressively when top local oﬃcials change, relative to SOEs. The hypothesis
is as follows.
H2. Compared to SOEs, non-SOEs’ expenditures on political networking will respond more aggressively to
top local oﬃcial turnover.
Previous studies have suggested that ﬁrms in poor institutional environments are more motivated to
establish political connections. Faccio (2006) shows that corporate political connections are more common
in countries with weak legal regimes and severe corruption. Li et al. (2006) ﬁnd that private entrepreneurs1 Quoted from “The Choices of Entrepreneurs in social transition period,” Feng Lun, 2013, Decision Guidance, March Issue.
2 In this study, we focus on the political connection perspective.
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ment. Yu and Pan (2008) and Luo and Zhen (2008) ﬁnd that political connections are more valuable for the
ﬁrms in regions with low levels of marketization. Based on the above ﬁndings, we examine the eﬀect of the
level of regional marketization on corporate political networking expenditures. We use the number of listed
ﬁrms in a city as a city-level marketization index and predict that corporations will increase political
socializing expenditures more aggressively in response to the replacement of top local oﬃcials if the level of
regional marketization is low. The hypothesis is as follows.
H3. The lower the level of regional marketization, the more aggressively corporate political networking
expenditures react to the turnover of top local politicians.3. Data and sample
Our sample consists of ﬁrms with A-shares listed on either the Shenzhen or the Shanghai Stock Exchanges
in the 2006–2010 period. Accounting and corporate governance data are obtained from the China Stock Mar-
ket and Accounting Research (CSMAR) database. The raw data on corporate expenditures on socializing
with government oﬃcials are hand-collected from the footnote of annual reports entitled “Cash ﬂow paid
relating to other operating activities.”3 We select the accounting categories that best reﬂect political network-
ing expenditures, i.e., travel expenses (Chai Lu Fei Yong), entertainment expenses (Ye Wu Zhao Dai Fei
Yong), overseas training expenses (Chu Guo Pei Xun Fei), meeting expenses (Hui Yi Fei Yong), social
expenses (Jiao Ji Ying Chou Fei Yong) and clerical expenses (Ban Gong Fei Yong). We exclude ﬁnancial ﬁrms
and ﬁrms that do not disclose any of the above-mentioned expenses in a ﬁscal year. Panel A of Table 1 sum-
marizes the distribution of the observations by year. It shows that nearly 40% of non-ﬁnancial listed compa-
nies disclose the above-mentioned expense categories in each sample year. Panel B shows the distribution of
the observations by industry. The mean of all expenses is as high as 153 million yuan in the construction
industry and the mean of the ratio of expenses to sales has the highest value (41.4%) in the manufacturing
industry. Panel C shows the distribution of observations by year and the type of ownership. The raw expenses
are much higher in the SOE group, but the ratio of expenses to sales is highest in the non-SOE group.
Province-level and city-level top oﬃcial turnover data are hand-collected from People Web4 and local gov-
ernment websites. To account for the lag eﬀect of oﬃcial turnover, we collect the turnover data from 2005 to
2009. The sample covers 31 provinces (including provincial-level cities and autonomous regions) and hundreds
of cities (including deputy provincial-level cities, prefecture-level cities, autonomous prefectures, municipal
districts and cities administrated by a province). Generally, the top oﬃcials in a province are the provincial
governor and the provincial secretary of the municipal Party committee. The top oﬃcials in a city are the
mayor and the secretary of the municipal Party committee.
Panel A of Table 2 shows the number and proportion of ﬁrms in the sample (i.e., all non-ﬁnancial listed
ﬁrms that provide the necessary data on expenditures) and in the general population (i.e., all non-ﬁnancial
listed ﬁrms) that experience province-level top oﬃcial turnover by year. The percentage of sample ﬁrms that
experience oﬃcial turnover is 34.21%, which is very close to the proportion in the general population (34.65%).
In each year, the proportion of turnovers in the sample is similar to the one in the general population. These
statistics illustrate that on average, approximately 30% of listed ﬁrms experience province-level top oﬃcial
turnover. Therefore understanding the eﬀect of oﬃcial turnover on ﬁrms is of great practical signiﬁcance.
Furthermore, in each year the proportion of ﬁrms in the sample that experience turnover is similar to the
proportion of ﬁrms in the general population that experience turnover, suggesting that our sample does
not have any selection bias problems. As there are 31 provinces in China, we further collect data on city-level
top oﬃcial turnover to provide more data and to analyze the turnover eﬀect more accurately.
Panel B of Table 2 reports the number and proportion of ﬁrms that experience the turnover of city-level top
oﬃcials in the sample group and in the general population by year. For each year, about 35 percent of the3 Since 2009, many ﬁrms have disclosed detailed items of management expenses in footnotes. These could be an alternative data resource
to the footnote item “cash ﬂow paid relating to other operating activities.”
4 Website: http://www.people.com.cn/.
Table 1
Sample distribution.
Year Number of all non-ﬁnancial listed ﬁrms (1) Number of sample ﬁrms that disclose expensesa (2) Percentage = (2)/(1) (%)
Panel A: Sample selection
2006 1314 476 36.23
2007 1395 493 35.34
2008 1508 725 48.08
2009 1559 763 48.94
2010 1666 735 44.12
Total 7442 3192 42.89
Industry Observations Mean Min Max Expenses/Sales
Panel B: Expenses by industry (in units of ten thousand)
Mining and Quarrying 86 6300.161 198.576 46248.580 0.006
Communication and Culture 17 1960.368 181.919 6310.508 0.057
Electricity, Gas, and Water 143 1939.411 81.846 14765.130 0.010
Real Estate 92 1269.452 57.620 4725.063 0.032
Construction 64 15336.820 487.888 231571.100 0.010
Transport, Storage 137 4060.865 96.139 70783.670 0.014
Farming, Forestry, and Animal Husbandry and Fishery 77 1799.931 144.481 9065.108 0.014
Wholesale and Retail Trade 201 2605.560 77.547 25770.000 0.008
Community Service 83 1400.274 59.523 26885.760 0.032
Information Technology 217 3279.027 36.078 34452.060 0.051
Manufacturing 1999 2489.368 21.707 55500.000 0.414
Other 76 1550.808 64.254 8154.706 0.036
Total 3192 2848.168 21.707 231571.100 0.035
Non-SOEs SOEs
Year Observations Mean Min Max Observations Mean Min Max
Panel C: Expenses by type of ownership (in units of ten thousand)
2006 154 1468.71 37.332 21,690 322 2164.585 44.0653 21733.58
2007 170 1782.174 49.0553 24,960 323 2733.266 21.7072 55,500
2008 279 1855.704 57.6206 35,320 446 3464.782 59.8487 153,500
2009 374 2412.249 36.0783 39139.11 389 3632.104 73.6892 183516.9
2010 356 2773.168 59.5237 46248.58 379 4266.515 47.2840 231571.1
Total 1333 2,200 36 46,000 1859 3,300 22 230,000
Non-SOEs SOEs
Year Observations Mean Observations Mean
Panel D: Ratio of expenses to sales by type of ownership
2006 154 0.027 322 0.0211
2007 170 0.0315 323 0.014
2008 279 0.0308 446 0.015
2009 374 0.0293 389 0.015
2010 356 0.147 379 0.014
Total 1333 0.061 1859 0.015
a The observations in the sample are the ﬁrm-year observations that disclose expense data and the other data used as control variables.
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cial A share-listed companies, namely 36 percent, that experience such replacement in the same period,
implying that our sample does not have any selection bias issues.
In a given year, the top oﬃcial turnover variable is province- or city- ﬁxed. In addition to the above ﬁrm-
year statistic, Table 2 summarizes the distribution of top oﬃcial turnover (TOT) events by province and city.
Panel C of Table 2 shows that all of the 31 provinces are included in our sample and that there are sample
companies in every province in which replacement of top oﬃcials occurs. In 2007, the number of provinces
experiencing top oﬃcial turnover is extremely high, because the 17th National Congress of the Communist
Party of China occurred in that year, and lead to many changes. Except for 2007, the turnover of top oﬃcials
is evenly distributed throughout the sample period.
Table 2
Top local oﬃcial turnover.
All non-ﬁnancial listed ﬁrms Sample ﬁrms
Year Observations (1) PTOT (2) Percentage = (2)/(1) (%) Observations (3) PTOT (4) Percentage = (4)/(3) (%)
Panel A: Province-level top oﬃcial turnover (PTOT) by ﬁrm-year
2005 1314 303 23.06 476 95 19.96
2006 1395 694 49.75 493 248 50.30
2007 1508 1126 74.67 725 515 71.03
2008 1559 59 3.78 763 39 5.11
2009 1666 397 23.83 735 195 26.53
Total 7442 2579 34.65 3192 1092 34.21
All non-ﬁnancial listed ﬁrms Sample ﬁrms
Year Observations (1) PTOT (2) Percentage = (2)/(1) (%) Observations (3) PTOT (4) Percentage = (4)/(3) (%)
Panel B: City-level top oﬃcial turnover (CTOT) by ﬁrm-year
2005 1314 356 27.09 476 134 28.15
2006 1395 557 39.93 493 194 39.35
2007 1508 524 34.75 725 259 35.72
2008 1559 544 34.89 763 272 35.65
2009 1666 584 35.05 735 227 30.88
Total 7442 2565 34.47 3192 1080 33.83
# Provinces # Provinces that experience PTOT
Year # provinces
covered by
all non-
ﬁnancial
ﬁrms (1)
#
provinces
covered
by sample
ﬁrms (2)
Percentage = (2)/
(1) (%)
# provinces that
experience PTOT
covered by all
non-ﬁnancial
ﬁrms (3)
# provinces
that experience
PTOT covered
by sample ﬁrms
(4)
Percentage of
provinces that
experience PTOT in
all non-ﬁnancial
ﬁrms = (3)/(1) (%)
Percentage of
provinces that
experience PTOT
in sample
ﬁrms = (4)/(2) (%)
Panel C: Province-level top oﬃcial turnover (PTOT) by province
2005 31 31 100 6 6 19.35 19.35
2006 31 31 100 12 12 38.71 38.71
2007 31 31 100 22 22 70.97 70.97
2008 31 31 100 7 7 22.58 22.58
2009 31 31 100 7 7 22.58 22.58
Total 31 31 100 31 31 100.00 100.00
# Cities # Cities that experience CTOT
Year # cities
covered by
all non-
ﬁnancial
ﬁrms (1)
# cities
covered
by
sample
ﬁrms (2)
Percentage = (2)/
(1) (%)
# cities that
experience CTOT
covered by all
non-ﬁnancial
ﬁrms (3)
# cities that
experience
CTOT covered
by sample ﬁrms
(4)
Percentage of cities
that experience
CTOT in all non-
ﬁnancial ﬁrms = (3)/
(1)
Percentage of
cities experienced
CTOT in sample
ﬁrms = (4)/(2) (%)
Panel D: City-level top oﬃcial turnover (CTOT) by city
2005 273 169 61.90 68 42 24.91% 24.85
2006 280 171 61.07 155 87 55.36% 50.88
2007 284 206 72.54 84 62 29.58% 30.10
2008 284 209 73.59 140 100 49.30% 47.85
2009 288 215 74.65 64 43 22.22% 20.00
Total 297 246 82.83 281 206 94.61% 83.74
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companies. Although our sample is limited by insuﬃcient data disclosure, a very large percentage of cities are
included in the sample. In addition, the proportion of cities that experience top oﬃcial turnover in the sample
is very similar to the proportion of non-ﬁnancial listed ﬁrms on a year-by-year basis, which suggests our
sample does not have any sample selection bias problems. Each year nearly 40 percent of the cities experience
top oﬃcial replacement, conﬁrming the need to analyze the eﬀects of this common event.
Table 3
Variable deﬁnitions.
Dependent variables
AbLnExpense Measures corporate political networking expenditures; equals the residual value of model 1
Variables of interest
PTO PTO equals 1 if top oﬃcials of the province-level region where ﬁrm i is located are replaced in year t  1, and 0
otherwise
CTO CTO equals 1 if top oﬃcials of the city-level region where ﬁrm i is located are replaced in year t  1, and 0 otherwise
NUM The number of listed ﬁrms in a city
NUM_1 Ranked variable. NUM_1 equals 10 if the number of listed ﬁrms in a city is in the top 10%; NUM_1 equals 9 if the
number of listed ﬁrms in a city is in the top 10% to top 20%, etc. NUM_1 equals 1 if the number of listed ﬁrms in a city
is in the bottom 10%
CTO * SOE Interaction of CTO and SOE
CTO * NUM Interaction of CTO and NUM
CTO * NUM_1 Interaction of CTO and NUM_1
Control variables
Size Natural log of total assets
SOE Stated-owned enterprise dummy; SOE equals 1 if the ﬁrm is a state-owned enterprise, and 0 otherwise
Lsh The shareholding percentage of the largest shareholder
ROA Return on Assets, which equals Net Income divided by Average Total Assets
Leverage Total liabilities/total assets
MB Market-to-Book, which is the market value of equity divided by the book value of equity
Msh Manager shareholding percentage, which equals the managers’ shareholding divided by liquid shares
BoardSize Number of directors on the board
LnComp Natural log form of top management’s top 3 compensation amounts
Revenue Natural log of total sales
InDir InDir equals 1 if the proportion of independent directors on the board is more than or equal to 1/3, and 0 otherwise
RegionLevel RegionLevel equals 2 if the company is located in Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, or Shenzhen; RegionLevel equals 1 if
the company is located in other provincial capital cities, deputy province cities, or sub-provincial cities; and 0
otherwise
FirmAge Age of the ﬁrm
Industry Industry dummies, which equal 1 if the observation belongs to each particular industry, and 0 otherwise
Year Year dummies, which equal 1 if the observation belongs to a particular year, and 0 otherwise
J. Li, L. Zhao / China Journal of Accounting Research 8 (2015) 25–39 314. Research design
4.1. Variable deﬁnitions
Variable deﬁnitions are provided in Table 3. The key variables of interest are political networking expen-
ditures (AbLnExpense) and top local oﬃcial turnover by province (PTO) and city (CTO).
We use the residual of model (1) as the measure of corporate political networking expenditures
(AbLnExpense). Basically, the above-mentioned expenses can be divided into three parts: normal ﬁrm operat-
ing expenditures, management perks and political socializing expenditures. However, it is diﬃcult to separate
political networking expenditures from managers’ perks and the measurement power of the variable is reduced
if management perks are excluded from the expenses.5 Therefore, we retain management perks but control for
the variables that inﬂuence normal operating expenditures in model (1) and control for the factors that aﬀect
management perks in the follow-up main regressions to diminish the potential for measurement noise.
We use model (1) to predict the residual (AbLnExpense) by industry.5 Fo
manag
comprLnExpense ¼ c0 þ c1Sizeþ c2Revenueþ c3RegionLevelþ e ð1Þr instance, corporate executives may treat government oﬃcials to a dinner. This activity may have the characteristics of both a
ement perk and political socializing. Thus, the power of our political socializing expenditure measure will be reduced if we
ehensively eliminate the factors related to management perks in model (1).
Table 4
Descriptive statistics.
N Mean Median Min Max s.d.
Panel A Descriptive statistics of continuous variables
AbLnExpense 3192 0.09 0.09 2.81 3.08 0.95
Size 3192 21.49 21.39 17.12 26.69 1.20
ROA 3192 0.04 0.03 1.72 2.06 0.10
MB 3192 2.03 1.57 0.54 43.85 1.79
Leverage 3192 0.57 0.50 0.01 61.34 1.40
Lsh 3192 35.96 34.50 3.64 83.74 14.98
Msh 3192 0.11 0.00 0.00 5.14 0.44
LnComp 3192 13.64 13.66 10.82 16.50 0.79
BoardSize 3192 9.25 9.00 4.00 18.00 1.81
NUM 3192 20.51 13.00 1.00 130.00 24.99
FirmAge 3192 8.38 9.00 0.00 20.00 4.63
N Value = 0 % for 0 (%) Value = 1 % for 1 (%)
Panel B Descriptive statistics of discrete variables
PTO 3192 2100 65.79 1092 34.21
CTO 3192 2112 66.17 1080 33.83
SOE 3192 1333 41.76 1859 58.24
32 J. Li, L. Zhao / China Journal of Accounting Research 8 (2015) 25–39where Size is the log value of total assets, Revenue is the log value of sales, and RegionLevel is the level of
regional development. For detailed variable deﬁnitions please refer to Table 3.
We construct the province-level and city-level top oﬃcial turnover variables, PTO and CTO, respectively.
Considering the lag eﬀect of turnover, PTO and CTO capture the turnover event in year t  1.
4.2. Descriptive statistics
Table 4 Panels A and B provide the descriptive statistics of the continuous and discrete variables in the
regressions. The mean of AbLnExpense is 0.09 and the proportion of sample ﬁrms that experience prov-
ince-level and city-level top oﬃcial turnover is 34.21% and 33.83%, respectively. The percentage of SOEs in
the sample is nearly 60% and the mean of the largest shareholder ownership is 35.96%. The largest number
of listed ﬁrms in one city is 130, but approximately 21 is the average number of ﬁrms in a city.
4.3. Multivariate analysis
To test whether corporations increase political networking expenditures when the top local oﬃcials change,
we construct the following model:AbLnExpense¼ b0þb1TurnOverþb2SOEþb3Lshþb4Mshþb5BoardSizeþb6LnCompþb7Size
þb8ROAþb9MBþb10Leverageþb11FirmAgeþb12RegionLevelþ IndustryþYearþ e ð2Þwhere AbLnExpense is corporate political networking expenditure measured by the residual of model (1) and
TurnOver represents PTO and/or CTO. The other control variables are deﬁned in Table 3.
We chose an exogenous event, speciﬁcally top local oﬃcial turnover, to test the validity of our corporate
political socializing measure. As it is a validity test of our measure of political networking expenditure, we
expect a signiﬁcant positive b1 in regression (2).
Previous studies use expense items as a proxy for management perks (Chen et al., 2005; Gul et al., 2011).
Although there is no theoretical link between management perks and oﬃcial turnover, we control for the fac-
tors that aﬀect management perks in model (2). The main results are shown in Table 5. We report robust
t-statistics based on standard errors adjusted for clustering at the ﬁrm level. In the ﬁrst column, we put
PTO in the regression and do not ﬁnd a signiﬁcant result. The results for CTO in the regression are shown
in column (3). The signiﬁcant positive coeﬃcient of CTO means that the turnover of city-level top oﬃcials
increases corporate expenditures on political networking. If both PTO and CTO are included in the regression
Table 5
Results of validity test (H1).
(1) (2) (3) (4)
AbLnExpense AbLnExpense AbLnExpense AbLnExpense
PTO 0.034 0.032
(1.032) (0.991)
CTO 0.072** 0.063** 0.061**
(2.118) (2.440) (2.301)
SOE 0.077 0.094* 0.093*
(1.457) (1.828) (1.811)
Size 0.049*** 0.053*** 0.053***
(2.711) (2.910) (2.898)
Lsh 0.003** 0.003 0.003
(1.973) (1.634) (1.632)
ROA 0.308* 0.407** 0.405**
(1.883) (2.519) (2.506)
MB 0.085*** 0.065*** 0.065***
(5.665) (4.877) (4.896)
Leverage 0.027*** 0.017** 0.018**
(3.302) (2.074) (2.082)
Msh 0.059 0.031 0.031
(1.271) (0.675) (0.685)
LnComp 0.263*** 0.275*** 0.274***
(7.745) (8.229) (8.200)
BoardSize 0.012 0.010 0.010
(0.971) (0.892) (0.897)
RegionLevel 0.415*** 0.399*** 0.399***
(12.233) (12.114) (12.119)
FirmAge 0.017*** 0.012** 0.012*
(2.797) (1.977) (1.941)
Industry Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled
Year Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled
Constant 2.635*** 0.087 2.713*** 2.693***
(5.414) (0.789) (5.611) (5.569)
Observations 3192 3192 3192 3192
F 22.088 24.999 24.966 24.109
Adj.R2 0.259 0.107 0.300 0.300
Robust t-statistics are in parentheses.
* p < 0.1.
** p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.
J. Li, L. Zhao / China Journal of Accounting Research 8 (2015) 25–39 33the results are consistent. In column (2), we regress AbLnExpense on CTO to show the explanatory power of
city top oﬃcial turnover on corporate political networking expenditure. The coeﬃcient is positive and signif-
icant and the adjusted R-square is 0.107. The above results conﬁrm the validity of our political networking
expenditure measure.
The eﬀect of corporate ownership type has been discussed broadly in China. Compared to SOEs, which
have obvious political ties, non-SOEs have more incentives to establish political connections. We predict that
non-SOEs react more aggressively when top local oﬃcials are replaced. We test the interaction eﬀect of state
ownership on the relationship of corporate political networking expenditure to top local oﬃcial turnover by
grouping the ﬁrms by ownership type. The results shown in Table 6 are consistent with our prediction. In the
non-SOE group, corporate political networking expenditure increases signiﬁcantly in response to city-level top
oﬃcial turnover, but the result disappears in the SOE group. This suggests that the systematic eﬀect of local
oﬃcial turnover on the increase of corporate political socializing expenditure is dominated by non-SOEs,
implying that non-SOEs tend to socialize with oﬃcials to create political connections when top oﬃcials are
replaced. We also use the interaction method to re-check these results, and the results are conﬁrmed.
Table 6
Results for ownership type (H2).
(1) (2) (3)
SOEs Non-SOEs Full sample
AbLnExpense AbLnExpense AbLnExpense
PTO 0.016 0.031 0.023
(0.369) (0.596) (0.673)
CTO 0.030 0.094** 0.078*
(0.859) (2.197) (1.774)
SOE 0.073
(1.264)
CTO * SOE 0.063*
(1.716)
Size 0.029 0.069*** 0.048***
(1.133) (3.087) (2.627)
Lsh 0.005** 0.001 0.004**
(2.295) (0.252) (2.224)
ROA 0.519 0.314* 0.289*
(1.641) (1.766) (1.764)
MB 0.136*** 0.047*** 0.085***
(5.511) (3.707) (5.738)
Leverage 0.024 0.016* 0.026***
(0.167) (1.776) (3.064)
Msh 0.583 0.002 0.300
(1.527) (0.048) (1.590)
LnComp 0.296*** 0.220*** 0.259***
(6.725) (4.438) (7.533)
BoardSize 0.015 0.009 0.009
(1.026) (0.420) (0.680)
RegionLevel 0.406*** 0.413*** 0.418***
(9.189) (8.662) (12.147)
FirmAge 0.012 0.018* 0.013**
(1.482) (1.859) (2.063)
Industry Controlled Controlled Controlled
Year Controlled Controlled Controlled
Constant 3.647*** 1.574** 2.589***
(5.940) (2.307) (5.458)
Observations 1859 1333 3192
F 13.474 18.201 19.873
Adj.R2 0.260 0.294 0.246
Robust t-statistics are in parentheses.
* p < 0.1.
** p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.
34 J. Li, L. Zhao / China Journal of Accounting Research 8 (2015) 25–39We use the number of listed ﬁrms in a city as a city-level marketization index to test whether the level of
regional marketization has an interaction eﬀect on the relationship between top local oﬃcial turnover and cor-
porate political networking expenditures. Previous studies have shown that corporations are more likely to
have political connections in regions with weak legal regimes, strong government intervention and lower
marketization (Faccio, 2006; Yu and Pan, 2008). Therefore, we predict that corporations located in regions
with low levels of marketization will socialize with oﬃcials more actively when top oﬃcials are replaced.
To test this hypothesis, we add the interaction term of the local marketization index (NUM) and city-level
top oﬃcial turnover (CTO) to the main regression.
The results summarized in Table 7 show that the coeﬃcient of the interaction term of the local marketiza-
tion index (NUM) and city-level top oﬃcial turnover (CTO) is signiﬁcantly negative, indicating that high levels
of marketization diminish the sensitivity of political networking expenditure to top local oﬃcial turnover.
Consistent with previous studies, we thus provide new evidence that political connections are pursued
Table 7
Results for levels of regional marketization (H3).
(1) (2) (3)
AbLnExpense AbLnExpense AbLnExpense
PTO 0.025 0.028 0.027
(0.797) (0.894) (0.829)
CTO 0.160*** 0.101*** 0.068*
(2.713) (2.966) (1.809)
NUM 0.001
(0.477)
NUM * CTO 0.002**
(2.099)
NUM_1 0.037
(1.395)
NUM_1 * CTO 0.041*
(1.842)
MktIndx 0.006
(0.504)
MktIndx * CTO 0.005
(0.422)
SOE 0.101** 0.103** 0.091*
(1.966) (2.006) (1.712)
Size 0.035* 0.036* 0.053***
(1.774) (1.818) (2.944)
Lsh 0.003 0.003 0.003
(1.646) (1.629) (1.532)
ROA 0.432*** 0.433*** 0.411**
(2.644) (2.640) (2.537)
MB 0.069*** 0.068*** 0.063***
(4.894) (4.846) (4.817)
Leverage 0.026 0.026 0.017*
(1.493) (1.455) (1.930)
Msh 0.040 0.044 0.135
(0.885) (0.997) (0.741)
LnComp 0.222*** 0.225*** 0.279***
(6.445) (6.508) (8.293)
BoardSize 0.005 0.006 0.009
(0.461) (0.481) (0.736)
RegionLevel 0.394*** 0.417*** 0.403***
(9.997) (10.012) (12.138)
FirmAge 0.011* 0.011* 0.011*
(1.856) (1.891) (1.726)
Industry Controlled Controlled Controlled
Year Controlled Controlled Controlled
Constant 2.314*** 2.262*** 2.660***
(4.717) (4.623) (5.486)
Observations 3192 3192 3192
F 21.431 21.540 22.462
Adj.R2 0.295 0.295 0.299
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number of city-listed ﬁrms (NUM_1) and the result is consistent. However, the result disappears if we use the
Fan-Wang marketization index instead of our NUM index, perhaps because the Fan-Wang index is a
province-level index that does not reﬂect the variation between cities.
4.4. Additional tests
In the recent years, the value of political connections to corporations has been explored around the world
(see, Fisman, 2001; Faccio et al., 2006; Goldman et al., 2009; Wu et al., 2010). Using our new measure of
Table 8
Economic consequences of political networking expenditures.
(1) (2)
OLS OLS
ROA Tobin’s Q
AbLnExpense 0.011*** 0.254***
(5.225) (5.275)
SOE 0.013*** 0.080
(2.903) (1.228)
Size 0.015*** 0.369***
(7.015) (6.519)
Lsh 0.000** 0.005**
(2.135) (2.224)
MB 0.012***
(2.663)
Leverage 0.017*** 0.373***
(2.820) (7.547)
Msh 0.020*** 0.851***
(5.506) (3.466)
RegionLevel 0.004 0.008
(1.399) (0.151)
Region Controlled Controlled
Industry Controlled Controlled
Year Controlled Controlled
Constant 0.279*** 9.872***
(5.733) (7.946)
Observations 3192 3192
F 13.171 39.035
Adj.R2 0.143 0.354
Robust t-statistics are in parentheses.
* p < 0.1.
** p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.
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intercourse.
We use return on total assets (ROAt) to measure accounting performance in year t. In column (1) of Table 8,
the coeﬃcient of AbLnExpense is signiﬁcantly positive, indicating that political ties formed through social
intercourse could improve ﬁrm performance. We also examine the eﬀect of such political ties on ﬁrm valua-
tion, which is proxied for by Tobin’s Q; the result is similar. Consistent with previous studies, we ﬁnd that
political connections obtained through social intercourse can increase corporate value.
We also conduct several robustness tests. First, we exclude all of the observations from 2007 as the 17th
National Congress of the Communist Party of China was convened that year and thus the number of prov-
inces that experienced top oﬃcial turnover is extremely high for that year. Second, we rule out the alternative
explanation that increased expenditures may be caused by increased corporate investment after top local
oﬃcials are replaced. Julio and Yook (2012) ﬁnd that ﬁrms reduce investments during election years. Other
researchers have argued that ﬁrms may increase investments after politicians are replaced and expenses
may increase correspondingly. To test this, we additionally control for corporate investment in our model
and the results remain the same. Following Xin et al. (2007), we deﬁne investment as the log value of the
change in net PP&E, long-term investment, and intangible assets. We do not ﬁnd a positive relationship
between our measure of expenditures on political social intercourse (AbLnExpense) and corporate investment;
therefore, we rule out the investment explanation.
Third, we use the IV-2SLS method to re-test the relationship between ﬁrm performance and corporate
political networking expenditures. There may be an endogeneity issue in the analysis of the association
between ﬁrm performance and corporate political socializing expenditure, as high-performing ﬁrms tend to
Table 9
Results of IV-2SLS regressions.
(1) 2SLS (2) 2SLS
Second step First step Second step First step
ROA AbLnExpense Tobin’s Q AbLnExpense
AbLnExpense 0.012* 0.797*
(1.896) (1.661)
LnAvgSalry 0.252** 0.474***
(2.034) (2.599)
SOE 0.009 0.105* 0.002 0.140**
(1.455) (1.869) (0.016) (2.565)
Size 0.014*** 0.017 0.364*** 0.010
(4.961) (0.986) (6.349) (0.579)
Lsh 0.000* 0.003* 0.003 0.004**
(1.917) (1.652) (1.046) (2.269)
MB 0.010* 0.086***
(1.727) (5.416)
Leverage 0.015*** 0.040*** 0.375*** 0.003
(3.386) (4.077) (7.568) (0.660)
Msh 0.056** 0.086*** 1.036*** 0.316*
(2.377) (5.416) (3.738) (1.678)
RegionLevel 0.011 0.411*** 0.263 0.405***
(0.774) (9.434) (1.123) (8.227)
Region Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled
Industry Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled
Year Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled
Constant 0.093** 3.071** 9.814*** 4.864**
(1.988) (2.429) (7.845) (2.498)
Observations 3192 3192 3192 3192
F 15.208 20.414 39.439 19.458
Adj.R2 0.129 0.211 0.341 0.246
Robust t-statistics are in parentheses.
* p < 0.1.
** p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.
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expenditure to diminish the endogeneity problem. The IV we use is the average regional salary. We think that
the average regional salary, to a certain extent, reﬂects regional consumption levels, and that the local
corporate social expenses should reﬂect the local level of consumption. However, there is no theoretical link
between ﬁrm performance or valuation and average regional salary. The results of the 2SLS are shown in
Table 9 and are consistent with the OLS results. They conﬁrm that corporate expenditures on political
networking are a new measure of corporate political connections and that increased amounts of political
networking increase ﬁrm value.5. Conclusions
In this study of corporate political connections, we document that socializing with government oﬃcials is a
common and important political strategy used by Chinese ﬁrms. We capture political connections using a new
measure based on corporate socializing expenditures. Several interesting ﬁndings emerge from our analysis.
First, we test the validity of the new measure using exogenous events, speciﬁcally the turnover of top local
oﬃcials, which results in the breaking of corporate political ties. We ﬁnd that corporate expenditures on
political networking increase signiﬁcantly when top local oﬃcials are replaced and this eﬀect is stronger for
non-SOEs, who seek political connections more aggressively. Second, this study shows that ﬁrms in regions
with low levels of marketization react more aggressively to the turnover of local politicians, which conﬁrms
38 J. Li, L. Zhao / China Journal of Accounting Research 8 (2015) 25–39previous ﬁndings that political connections are more important when the institutional environment is poor.
We also ﬁnd that corporate expenditures on socializing with oﬃcials have a positive eﬀect on corporate per-
formance and valuation, which suggests that socializing expenditures perform well as a new measure of cor-
porate political connections and conﬁrms the valuation eﬀect of corporate political connections.
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